Multi-Verifier Signatures by Roeder, Tom et al.
Multi-Verier Signatures
Tom Roedery
Microsoft Research
throeder@microsoft.com
Rafael Pass Fred B. Schneider
Department of Computer Science, Cornell University
frafael, fbsg@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
Multi-verier signatures generalize traditional digital signatures to a secret-key setting. Just
like digital signatures, these signatures are both transferable and secure under arbitrary (un-
bounded) adaptive chosen-message attacks. In contrast to digital signature schemes, however,
we exhibit practical constructions of multi-verier signature schemes that are provably secure
and are based only on pseudorandom functions in the plain model without any random oracles.
1 Introduction
Digital signatures [12, 23, 16] are relatively expensive to generate. Moreover, practical digital
signature schemes rely on either strong number-theoretic assumptions [10, 5] or are proven secure
only in the random oracle model [23]. In contrast, message authentication codes (MACs) are orders
of magnitude faster and can be based on pseudorandom functions. MACs, however, rely on secret-
key setup and do not provide transferability|the property that signed messages accepted by one
server and forwarded to other servers will be accepted there too. Transferability is essential in
many applications of digital signature schemes (e.g., in distributed systems [7, 27, 20]).
A natural question, then, is if the secret-key setup used for MACs can be leveraged to get more
ecient, yet provably secure, digital signature schemes. We answer this question in the armative
by introducing multi-verier signatures (MVS), which generalize digital signatures to a secret-key
setting with a signer and multiple veriers, each using dierent keys. We also provide two ecient
MVS constructions. They are based only on the existence of pseudorandom functions and do not
assume random oracles:
 Atomic Signatures requires the signer to solve a system of linear equations. As far as we
know, Atomic Signatures constitutes the rst practical and provably secure signature scheme
based only on symmetric-key primitives.
 Chain Signatures provides -limited transferability, the property that signatures can be trans-
ferred at least  1 times and still be accepted by receivers. Although -limited transferability
is weaker than transferability, it suces in many settings (e.g., see systems [7, 20, 27, 22],
where each message is forwarded only a xed number of times). Furthermore, for values of
 used in practical protocols, Chain Signatures outperforms the fastest implementations of
digital signature schemes (even though these digital signature schemes are only secure in the
random oracle model [23]).
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1Our MVS constructions require an unusual secret-key setup|pairwise shared keys distributed
in such a way that the signer does not know which key corresponds to which verier. This prevents
the signer from creating signatures that would be accepted by some veriers but not others. The
required secret-key setup is easily implemented, for example, in an operating system (OS) or small
distributed service. Processes in an OS already trust the OS, so the OS can distribute shared keys
when a process is created. Similarly, a small distributed service (e.g., [7, 20, 27]) that is managed
by a single administrator can distribute keys before the service begins executing. In these practical
settings, MVS schemes provide a speed advantage over common digital signature schemes.
The idea of constructing signature schemes in a secret-key setting began with Chaum and
Roijakkers [9]. However, none of that work or its successors (e.g., [18, 17, 26, 24, 22]) satises fully
adaptive security|that unforgeability holds even with respect to an adversary that can see an a
priori unbounded number of signatures on messages of its choice. In modern network environments,
supporting adaptive security is important.
Although our constructions are relatively clean and simple, the proofs of security turn out to be
signicantly more complicated. A major theme in both is to seemingly weaken the construction in
order to gain adaptive security. This idea goes back to the zero-knowledge argument construction
of Feige and Shamir [14], where a trapdoor is embedded into the proof systems in order to facilitate
zero-knowledge simulation. Our schemes rely on a similar argument. However, in contrast to
previous applications of this technique, we can show in our scenario that this weakening is essential.
In fact, for the case of Chain Signatures, the most natural implementation using MACs does not
yield a scheme secure under adaptive attacks (see Remark 4.1 in x4). Yet, surprisingly, if we slightly
weaken the scheme by making public to whom a certain subset of the keys belongs, then the scheme
is provably secure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Assumptions and a game-based denition of MVS schemes are
discussed in x2. In x3 and x4, we present constructions of our MVS schemes and prove that they
work. Finally, x5 gives performance results from an implementation of our schemes, and related
work is discussed in x6.
2 Denitions of Multi-Verier Signature Schemes
Our constructions of MVS schemes rely on MACs, which take a message m and a key k as input and
output a tag that can be used to authenticate m given k. The traditional model of MAC security [3]
requires that it be hard for an adversary A to generate a message m and tag  that will be accepted
by a receiver, even if A has access to a MAC oracle (as long as A has not already requested that m
be signed by the oracle). We write Ar for an adversary A using randomness r.
We require the MAC to satisfy a stronger property (similar to Bellare, Goldreich, and Mityagin
[2]), called Chosen Tag Attack (CTA) Unforgeability, which additionally gives adversaries access to
a verication oracle VF(m;;k) such that
VF(m;;k) =
(
1 if MAC(m;k) = 
0 otherwise.
If VF(m;;k) = 1 holds, then the tag is accepted.
Let MACreq(A;m;k;r) be a predicate that is true if an adversary Ar requested m from its MAC
oracle using key k in a given execution. Then, for a given security parameter d, we can dene the
following property.
2CTA Unforgeability. For every non-uniform Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) adversary A,
there exists a negligible function  such that
Pr[k   Gen(1d);r   f0;1g1;
m;   AMAC(;k);VF(;;k)
r (1d) :
:MACreq(A;m;k;r) ^ VF(m;;k) = 1]  (d):
Pseudorandom functions (see [15] for an overview) can be used to construct MACs satisfying
CTA Unforgeability.
Multi-Verier Signatures
We dene an MVS scheme to be a triple (Gen, Sign, Ver) of algorithms that depend on a set I of n
veriers; each verier may use a dierent key when calling Ver. And each server executes a verier
with a dierent key. These algorithms operate as follows, where argument d is a security parameter
and b species a given number of bits.
 Gen(1d;1n) is a PPT algorithm that outputs a vector k of keys for the signer and a vector
Kj of keys for each verier j 2 I. Key k in k or Kj (for any j 2 I) is an element of f0;1gb.
 Sign(m;k) takes m 2 f0;1gb and produces1 a tag .
 For each j 2 I, Ver(m;;Kj) produces a value that is either 1, 0, an element of N>0, or
?.2 If Ver(m;;Kj) returns 1, then we say that  is accepted by j, and if Ver(m;;Kj)
returns 0, then we say that  is not accepted by j. A return value  2 N>0 means that  is
accepted by j, and also that there is a lower bound  1 on the number of times this tag can
be transferred and still cause veriers at other correct receivers to return a value in N>0. If
Ver(m;;Kj) returns ?, then j sets a state variable vj to ?; verier j thereafter believes the
signer to be compromised.
Note that the above description implies Ver is a stateful algorithm: whenever Ver produces ?
for a message purporting to come from signer i, it decides that i is compromised and remembers
this fact. Thereafter, Ver will only return ? for message and tag pairs purporting to come from i.
Let  be an element of N1 , N>0[f1g, and let req(A;m;k;r) be a predicate that is true if an
adversary Ar requested m from its signing oracle using keys k in a given execution. MVS schemes
satisfy four properties: -Completeness, Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, and Transferability.
-Completenessstipulates that, for any Kj and any message m, a tag  generated by Sign(m;k)
cause Ver(m;;Kj) to return a value that is greater than or equal to . Note that 1-Completeness
thus requires Ver(m;;Kj) to return 1; the value 1 means that a message can be transferred
an arbitrary number of times, just like digital signatures. Formally, we can state this property as
follows.
-Completeness. There exists a negligible function  such that for any message m and any j 2 I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n) : Ver(m;Sign(m;k);Kj) < ]  (d;n):
1For simplicity of exposition, we dene MVS schemes for b-bit messages only. These denitions are easily extended
to arbitrary-length messages. Our constructions are described for both xed-length and arbitrary-length messages.
2Assume that 1 satises only the following properties: 1   1 = 0, 8a 2 N : 1 > a, and 8a 2 N :

1   a

 = 
a   1

 = 1.
3As with digital signature schemes, Unforgeability requires that no adversary A be able to
generate a message m and tag  that will be accepted by any correct verier if A has not previously
requested a tag for m from its signing oracle, even if A might have compromised any set I0 of
veriers. Formally, we can state this property as follows.
Unforgeability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function  such
that for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);r   f0;1g1;
(m;)   A
Sign(;k);fVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0
r (1d;1n;fKigi2I0) :
:req(A;m;k;r) ^ (9j 2 I   I0 : Ver(m;;Kj) 2 N1)]  (d;n):
Non-Accusability requires that no adversary A be able to generate a message and tag pair that
causes any correct verier to return ? if the signer is not compromised, even if A can request
signatures on arbitrary messages and has compromised an arbitrary subset of veriers. Formally,
we can state this property as follows.
Non-Accusability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function 
such that for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);
(m;)   ASign(;k);fVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0(1d;1n;fKigi2I0) :
(9j 2 I   I0 : Ver(m;;Kj) = ?)]  (d;n):
Transferability requires that even a compromised signer is unable to create a tag on which
any pair of correct veriers return values that dier by more than 1; this property implies that
if verication of a message m and tag  at any correct verier returns v, then m and  can be
transferred between correct veriers at least v 1 times. A tag that does not satisfy Transferability
is said to be split.3
Our notion of Transferability is slightly dierent than the notion of Transferability guaranteed
by standard digital signatures. In particular, a verier j that returns a value in N1 for a message
m and tag  is not guaranteed that any non-compromised verier j0 to which it passes m and 
will also return a value in N1; the other possibility is that j0 returns ?|which means that j0 has
acquired proof that the signer is compromised.
Formally, we can state this property as follows.
Transferability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function  such
that for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);
(m;)   AfVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0(1d;1n;k;fKigi2I0) :
(9j;j0 2 I   I0 : Ver(m;;Kj) 6= ? ^ Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ?
^

Ver(m;;Kj)   Ver(m;;Kj0)

 > 1)]  (d;n):
3Verication algorithms for MVS schemes allow some veriers to return ? and conclude nothing about the tag.
Each tag divides the correct veriers into two groups: those that accept the tag and those that nd the signer
compromised. This specication is reminiscent of Crusader's Agreement [13], where the correct receivers are divided
into those that agree on a single value and those that know the sender to be compromised.
4An MVS scheme that satises -Completeness for  2 N>0 is called a -MVS scheme; tags
generated by this scheme can be transferred at least    1 times. An MVS scheme that satises
1-Completeness is called an 1-MVS scheme; tags generated by this scheme can be transferred
an unlimited number of times. A stronger version of Transferability, called Perfect Transferability,
would require that (d;n) = 0 in the denition of Transferability; Appendix C shows that 1-MVS
schemes satisfying Perfect Transferability are essentially traditional digital signature schemes.4
Similar to digital signature schemes, an MVS scheme can satisfy Strong Unforgeability, which
requires that if A did not receive m and  from its signing oracle, then m and  will not cause any
verier to return a value greater than 0 (leading this verier to accept the pair) or return ? (leading
this verier to conclude that the signer is compromised). Dene predicate recv(A;(m;);k;r) to
be true if A, using randomness r, received m and  from the signing oracle using keys k. Formally,
the property is written as follows:
Strong Unforgeability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible func-
tion  such that for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);r   f0;1g1;
(m;)   A
Sign(;k);fVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0
r (1d;1n;fKigi2I0) :
:recv(A;(m;);k;r) ^ (9j 2 I   I0 : Ver(m;;Kj) 6= 0)]  (d;n):
Note that Strong Unforgeability implies both Unforgeability and Non-Accusability. An MVS
scheme that satises Strong Unforgeability in addition to -Completeness and Transferability is
called a Strong -MVS scheme.
3 Atomic Signatures
Atomic Signatures is a Strong 1-MVS scheme in which a signer computes a tag for a message
m by using MACs to generate and solve a system of linear equations that depend on m. Unlike
MACs and digital signature schemes, generation algorithm GenAS for Atomic Signatures distributes
disjoint, equal-sized sets of random keys to each verier; a verier shares each key in each set with
the signer, but the signer does not know which keys it shares with which verier.
More precisely, for n veriers and security parameter d, generation algorithm GenAS(1d;1n) for
Atomic Signatures produces dn keys k1;k2;:::;kdn, where, for each j such that 1  j  dn, kj 2
f0;1gb is a key for a MAC. GenAS also generates dn random vectors zj = hzj;1;zj;2;:::;zj;dni (one
vector for each key kj), where for each j and i such that 1  j  dn and 1  i  n, each entry zj;i is
an element of f0;1gb. GenAS then sets k to be a vector of key pairs h(k1;z1);(k2;z2);:::;(kdn;zdn)i.
And GenAS creates n vectors K1;K2;:::;Kn that each contain a unique, randomly chosen set of
d key pairs from k such that Ki and Kj are disjoint for each distinct pair i and j of indices. Set k
is called the signing key pairs and the n vectors K1;K2;:::;Kn are called the verifying key pairs.
We say that a verier j owns each key k in Kj.
Signing algorithm SignAS(m;k) takes message m and signing key pairs k as input5 and outputs
a vector Ad(m) = A1, A2, :::, Adn of subtags, obtained by solving the following equation, where
4Boneh, Durfee, and Franklin [4] show a related lower bound: digital signatures are required for short collusion-
resistant multicast MAC constructions.
5Atomic Signatures as described can sign arbitrary-length messages as long as the MAC can generate tags for
arbitrary-length messages.
5b-bit strings are treated as elements in the nite eld GF(2b),
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Recall that solving equation (1) corresponds to solving the dn instances (1  j  dn) of the
following equation simultaneously:
MAC(m;kj) =
dn X
t=1
zj;tAt: (2)
Dene predicate roweq(m;A;(kj;zj)) to be true exactly when equation (2) holds for m, A, and
(kj,zj).
Verication algorithm VerAS(;;Kj) keeps state vj to record that it has been called with a
message and tag that indicate the signer is compromised. VerAS(m;;Kj) operates as follows:
 If vj is set to ?, then VerAS(m;;Kj) returns ?.
 Otherwise, if roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds for all d pairs (k;z) in Kj, then VerAS(m;;Kj) returns
1.
 If no roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds for any (k;z) in Kj, then VerAS(m;;Kj) returns 0.
 Otherwise, there is some key pair (k;z) 2 Kj for which roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds, and a dier-
ent key pair (k0;z0) 2 Kj for which roweq(m;;(k0;z0)) does not hold. So, VerAS(m;;Kj)
returns ? and sets vj to ?.
Remark 3.1.
This verication scheme is based on the idea that it is hard for an adversary that
does not know a key (k;z) in k to produce a message m and tag  that will cause
roweq(m;;(k;z)) to hold. The intuition behind the proof is that the MAC is hard to
forge.
This scheme also relies on it being hard for an adversary that has not compromised the
signer to produce a message and tag pair that causes any non-compromised verier to
return ?. This property must hold even if the adversary can see a polynomial number
of messages and tags for messages of its choice. The intuition behind the proof of this
property is that it is hard to nd new solutions to under-determined equations over
variables with randomly-chosen, unknown coecients (the pseudorandom MAC values
and the random rows of the matrix).
However, it is easy for a compromised signer to cause one verier to return ?: the signer
can create a new set of signing keys k0 by replacing one of the keys in k with a random
bit string. Then the signer uses k0 to generate and solve equation (1). Some verier j
will then only nd d 1 satised instances of roweq(m;;(k;z)) and will return ?. The
only task that must be dicult for a compromised signer is creating a message and tag
pair that cause one non-compromised verier to return 1 and another to return 0.
6Remark 3.2.
The verication and signing algorithms for Atomic Signatures as described above are
expensive to compute: each verier has d+d2n keys, and the signer must solve a matrix
equation at cost O(d3n3) to generate a signature. Both of these costs can be reduced.
One way to reduce the number of keys is for each verier j to share 2d keys with the
signer instead of d + d2n|instead of keys (k;z), a verier shares a pair (k1;k2), where
keys k1 and k2 are elements of f0;1gb. Key k1 is used to compute MACs in the place of k
in equation (1), and k2 is used to generate matrix row elements zt = MAC(t;k2) for t in
f1;2;:::;dng; each verier then only needs 2d keys: 2 for each of its d rows. The proofs
follow in the same way as with a randomly chosen matrix but with an extra hybrid step
to go from random matrix elements to matrix elements generated by a pseudorandom
function.6
The cost of generating a signature can be reduced further. GenAS can produce a pref-
actored matrix (using the LU factorization, for instance) for use by SignAS on the
right-hand side of equation (1). Factoring is cost-eective here, because the matrix is
independent of the message to be signed|factoring costs O(d3n3) but only needs to
be done once, and solutions to equation (1) can be found for a factored matrix in time
O(d2n2).
3.1 Properties of Atomic Signatures
Since a Strong 1-MVS scheme must satisfy 1-Completeness, Strong Unforgeability, and Trans-
ferability, we prove that Atomic Signatures is a Strong 1-MVS by proving two lemmas. The rst
establishes that Atomic Signatures satises 1-Completeness and Strong Unforgeability; the second
that it satises Transferability.
Lemma 1. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Atomic Signatures satises 1-Completeness
and Strong Unforgeability.
Proof. 1-Completeness. This follows from non-singularity of the matrix in equation (1), since a
non-singular matrix allows a solution Ad(m) to be found for equation (1). Any solution satises 1-
Completenessby denition, since roweq(m;Ad(m);(kj;zj)) will hold for each row j. The probability
of a random matrix of size dn  dn over a nite eld of size 2b being singular is known [8] to be
1  
Qdn
i=1(1   1=2bi), which is negligible when d and n are polynomial in b.
Strong Unforgeability. Lemmas 10{12 from Appendix A simplify the problem to the case
where all but one verier q is compromised, MAC(;k) for row j is replaced by a random function
vj(), and adversaries are allowed no verication oracle queries.
For such an adversary to violate Strong Unforgeability, it must produce a message m and tag
0 such that it has never received (m;0) from the signing oracle, and VerAS(m;0;Kq) 6= 0 holds;
this occurs exactly when roweq(m;0;(k;z)) holds for at least one pair (k;z) in Kq. We consider
two cases. In Case 1, m has been received from the signing oracle, but with a dierent tag . In
Case 2, m has never been received from the signing oracle. Since the MAC for a given row i is
replaced with a random function vi, we write (vi;zi) in the place of key information (ki;zi).
6The adversary in this case is given oracle access to the MAC functions, so it can compute signatures eciently.
7Case 1. Consider an adversary that makes a series of signing oracle queries m1, m2, :::, mp,
receives responses 1, 2, :::, p and nally outputs a message mw (where 1  w  p) and tag 0
such that 0 6= w. Note that 0 must not equal w because A cannot return a message and tag
pair that it received from its signing oracle. We show that for any choices of m1, m2, :::, mp, 1,
2, :::, p, the probability that 0 is a valid tag for mw is negligible.
We consider the case where the adversary violates Strong Unforgeability for a particular message
mw and produces a tag 0 satisfying the equation for mw for a particular row i. We will then use
the Union Bound to bound the probability for any row and any message. Let (v;z) be the key
information for row i. Recall that message m and tag  induces an equation for key information
(v;z): v(m) =
Pdn
t=1 ztt.
The probability that a tag 0 produced by an adversary satises the given equation is bounded
by the following conditional probability for any choice of 0, 1, 2, :::, p where 0 6= w.
Pr
v;z
"
v(mw) =
dn X
t=1
zt0
t
 
 8j 2 f1;:::;pg : v(mj) =
dn X
t=1
ztj;t
#
This is the probability that a given tag 0 violates Strong Unforgeability using a given row with
randomly chosen coecients, constrained by the fact that 1 through p satisfy the equation for
this row. And the denition of conditional probability states that, for events A and B, Pr[A j B] =
Pr[A ^ B]=Pr[B]. For the conditional probability above, event A is v(mw) =
Pdn
t=1 zt0
t, and event
B is 8j 2 f1;:::;pg : v(mj) =
Pdn
t=1 ztj;t. So, the probability can be split into two components:
(i) Prv;z[8j 2 f1;:::;pg : v(mj) =
Pdn
t=1 ztj;t] and (ii) Prv;z[v(mw) =
Pdn
t=1 zt0
t ^ 8j 2
f1;:::;pg : v(mj) =
Pdn
t=1 ztj;t]. We will consider these two components separately. For each
component, we can consider the values of 0 and 1, 2, :::, p as xed and the (v;z) as variables.
Fixing any values for the dn variables z1, z2, :::, zdn in component (i) induces a single solution
(namely v(mi) =
Pdn
t=1 zti;t) for the values of v(mi). This means that there are 2bdn ways to choose
the variables to satisfy the equations. And there are, a priori, 2b(dn+p) ways to choose the values
for dn + p variables. Since the probability is over the random choice of variables, this probability
can be computed as the quotient: 2bdn=2b(dn+p) = 1=2 bp.
In component (ii), each way of setting dn 1 of the variables leads to a unique solution for the
remaining p + 1 variables. To see why, recall that vectors 0 and w must dier. So, they must
dier in at least one of their dn entries; suppose, without loss of generality, that they dier in
position a. If we set the dn   1 variables z1, z2, :::, za 1, za+1, :::, zdn to any value, then we are
left with p equations of the form v(mi) = i;aza + ci for i 2 f1;:::;pg and constants ci and one
equation v(mw) = 0
aza + c0 for some constant c0. Subtracting the equation v(mw) = w;aza + cw
from v(mw) = 0
aza+c0 eliminates v(mw) and leaves an equation that uniquely determines the value
of za, since 0
a   w;a 6= 0. This value for za then uniquely determines the values of v(m1), v(m2),
:::, v(mp), by denition. So, there are 2b(dn 1) solutions in total. And, as before, there are 2b(dn+p)
ways to choose values for these variables. So, the probability is 2b(dn 1)=2b(dn+p) = 2 b(p+1).
We can use the denition of conditional probability and the two component probabilities to
compute the bound on an adversary violating Strong Unforgeability using a particular equation
and a particular message: 2 b(p+1)=2 bp = 2 b. The Union Bound over the d equations and p
possible messages then gives a general bound of pd=2b, which is negligible.
Case 2. Now, suppose that m was never received from the signing oracle, and consider any
pair m and  generated by adversary A. Since A never received m from the signing oracle, no
function of the values vi(m) for row i has been seen by A. So, the output of A is independent of
8vi(m). Fix a key (vj;zj) in the keys owned by verier q and suppose, without loss of generality,
that the zj are all known to the adversary. For a given m, there is one choice of the value of vj(m)
such that vj(m) =
Pdn
t=1 zj;tt holds and there are a total of 2b ways to choose the value of vj(m).
Since the choice of  is independent of vj(m), and vj is a random function, the probability of
 satisfying the given row equation is 1=2b. The Union Bound then gives the probability of (m;)
violating Strong Unforgeability for any of the d row equations to be d=2b, which is negligible.
Then, Lemmas 10{12 give a polynomial increase in each bound to get back to the general case.
But a polynomial increase of a negligible function still leaves it negligible. So, Atomic Signatures
satises Strong Unforgeability.
Proving that Atomic Signatures satises Transferability is more challenging. A compromised
signer able to generate a split tag must have knowledge about which verier owns which keys. So,
we devise a game over the signing keys, called Idealized Random Keys, by which we show that no
adversary gets enough information to divide the signing keys into two disjoint sets, where each set
contains all the keys owned by some verier. Then, given an adversary that can violate Transfer-
ability, we produce a new adversary that can divide the signing keys into two such disjoint sets.
This shows that the security of Idealized Random Keys reduces to Transferability of Atomic Signa-
tures. And we also show that Idealized Random Keys is secure, which means that Transferability
holds for Atomic Signatures.
3.2 Idealized Random Keys
Idealized Random Keys is a game between a requester and a set I of n checkers that each own a set
of keys. The requester can only perform ownership queries: asking checkers about the ownership
of keys. Checkers return ? in response to ownership queries about keys they own. The important
property of Idealized Random Keys, called Non-Separability, is that no adversary A can use own-
ership queries to separate the set of keys into two disjoint subsets, each of which contains all the
keys owned by some checker that has not already returned ?.
Formally, Idealized Random Keys consists of a pair (GenIR;CheckIR) of algorithms that operate
as follows:
 GenIR(1d;1n) generates a vector k of dn keys uniformly at random and partitions them into
n disjoint sets K1, K2, :::, Kn of size d, each set owned by one checker j 2 I.
 Check algorithm CheckIR(;Kj) keeps state sj to record whether the requester has ever made
an ownership query to j for an element of Kj. When requester i makes an ownership query
on a given key k 2 k, CheckIR(k;Kj) operates as follows.
{ if k 2 Kj or sj = ?, then CheckIR(k;Kj) returns ? and sets sj to ?.
{ Otherwise, CheckIR(k;Kj) returns 1.
This behavior corresponds to information adversaries can glean from attacks on Atomic Sig-
natures. For instance, a compromised signer j can create a tag  for any message m by solving
equation (1) using correct keys for all rows but one. Then j sends m and  to a verier j0. If j0
owns the keys for this row, then j0 will return ?. This corresponds to a requester asking checker j0
about a key in Kj0. But if j0 does not own the keys for this row, then j0 will return 1; so, j learns
that j0 does not own the keys for this row. This corresponds to a requester asking checker j0 about
a key it does not own.
Non-Separability can be written formally as follows:
9Non-Separability. For all adversaries A, there is a negligible function  such that for any choice
of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   GenIR(1d;1n);
(K;K0)   AfCheckIR(;Ki)gi2I I0(1d;1n;k;fKigi2I0) :
(9j;j0 2 I   I0 : sj 6= ? ^ sj0 6= ?
^ Kj  K ^ Kj0  K0 ^ K \ K0 = ;)]  (d;n):
To show that Non-Separability holds for Idealized Random Keys, we rst consider the case
n = 2, then provide a reduction from n = 2 to general n. These proofs will also show how to choose
d for a given n so that Idealized Random Keys satises Non-Separability with a given probability
0 > 0,
Lemma 2. Idealized Random Keys for 2 checkers satises Non-Separability with probability
 2d
d
 1
.
Proof. Consider a passive adversary B that never makes any ownership queries to its CheckIR
oracles but produces sets K and K0 that violate Non-Separability. Keys are distributed randomly,
so B has no information about which keys correspond to which checkers. Therefore, B's output is
independent of the distribution of keys to checkers. There are
 2d
d

choices for K and K0, only one
of which violates Non-Separability. So, B's probability of outputting this K and K0 is
 2d
d
 1
.
Now suppose that some adversary A, potentially making ownership queries to its CheckIR
oracles, violates Non-Separability with probability 0. When A succeeds, no ownership queries to
its oracles can have returned ?, since there are only two checkers, j and j0, and neither sj nor sj0
can be ? for Non-Separability to be violated. So, A's ownership queries must always have returned
1. This means that B can simulate these ownership queries by always returning 1. Whenever B's
simulation would be incorrect (because CheckIR should have returned ?), A would have received
? and failed to violate Non-Separability. So, B succeeds at least as often as A. Then, A's success
probability is also no better than
 2d
d
 1
, since this is an upper bound on any passive adversary
B.
Theorem 3. Idealized Random Keys for n checkers satises Non-Separability with probability  n
2

=
 2d
d

.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose adversary A violates Non-Separability for n check-
ers for some I0  I with probability greater than
 n
2

=
 2d
d

. We construct B that violates Non-
Separability for Idealized Random Keys with 2 checkers with probability greater than
 2d
d
 1
,
which contradicts Lemma 2.
B is given k as well as CheckIR oracles for its two checkers and proceeds to construct keys for
A and simulate A's oracles:
1. B calls GenIR(1d;1n) to get k0 and fKigi2I.
2. B then chooses j and j0 uniformly at random from I I0 and forms k00 = (k0 (Kj[Kj0))[k.
This replaces the keys for j and j0 in k0 with the keys in k. B assigns one of its CheckIR
oracles to j and the other to j0.
3. B calls A with 1d, 1n, k00, and fKigi2I0 and simulates A's ownership queries as follows:
 if i 6= j and i 6= j0, then B has all the keys for Ki, so B can emulate exactly the execution
of CheckIR(;Ki), including keeping state.
10 If i = j or i = j0, then B forwards the ownership query on to B's oracle for i.
4. When A returns K and K0, B returns K and K0.
If A succeeds, then there is some pair i, i0 2 I I0 such that Ki  K and Ki0  K0 and K\K0 = ;.
Since j and j0 were chosen uniformly at random, the probability that the unordered pair (i;i0) is
the same as the pair (j;j0) is
 n
2
 1, so B succeeds with probability greater than (
n
2)=(
2d
d)
(
n
2) =
 2d
d
 1
.
This contradicts Lemma 2.
So, contrary to the initial assumption, A must only be able to succeed with probability less
than or equal to
 n
2

=
 2d
d

.
Theorem 3 provides a way to determine the value of d for a given choice of probability 0
of a compromised requester violating Non-Separability for n veriers. Theorem 3 implies that
0 <
 n
2

=
 2d
d

. Since
 2d
d

 2d for d  0, this can be simplied to 0 <
 n
2

=2d. Thus, it suces to
set d to O

log

n2
0

.
3.3 Transferability of Atomic Signatures
Idealized Random Keys provides a framework for proving that Atomic Signatures satises Trans-
ferability. We prove this in the form of a reduction, showing that Non-Separability of Idealized
Random Keys implies Transferability of Atomic Signatures. Since Theorem 3 shows that Non-
Separability holds for Idealized Random Keys, it then follows that Transferability holds for Atomic
Signatures.
Lemma 4. If Idealized Random Keys satises Non-Separability, then Atomic Signatures satises
Transferability.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive by constructing an adversary B that violates Non-Separability
of Idealized Random Keys using an adversary A that violates Transferability of Atomic Signatures.
B is given keys k for Idealized Random Keys.
For each key k 2 k, B generates random values z = hz1;z2;:::;zdni to construct a set of keys
to pass to A for Atomic Signatures. B will respond to signing and verication oracle queries for
A; B knows signing keys k but does not know which correct veriers own which keys. Answering
signing queries is easy for B, since no knowledge of key ownership is required|B simply uses all
signing keys to generate a signature.
For verication queries on a message m and tag , B knows the signing keys, so B can check
to see if roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds for each (k;z) 2 k. If roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds for all (k;z) 2 k,
then B can return 1; and if no instance of roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds for any (k;z) 2 k, then B can
return 0.
But if some instances hold and others do not, then B does not know what to return for a
given verication query to verier j, since B does not know which instances use keys in Kj. One
way to solve this problem would be for B to make ownership queries to CheckIR for keys for
some instances|knowing which veriers own which keys for more keys gives B a higher proba-
bility of answering correctly. But if CheckIR(;Kj) returns ? on any such ownership query when
VerAS(m;;Kj) would not have returned ?, then sj gets set to ?, and vj is not set to ? in
Atomic Signatures. In this case, B might not be able to violate Non-Separability using the message
and tag that A returns to violate Transferability; for instance, A might return a message and
tag that violate Transferability for j and some other verier. And such a j could not be used
to violate Non-Separability, since sj = ? would hold. So, B needs to ensure that if a ownership
11query to CheckIR(;Kj) causes CheckIR(;Kj) to return ? in the course of simulating a call to
VerAS(m;;Kj), then VerAS(m;;Kj) would also have returned ?.
To gain more information about the values returned by VerAS, B proceeds as follows: B ran-
domly generates n additional known key pairs (k
1;z
1), (k
2;z
2), :::, (k
n;z
n), and assigns (k
j;z
j) to
verier j for 1  j  n. B adds these keys to k, creating k0, and creates n state variables s1, s2, :::,
sn, initializing each to 1. So, B will use A on security parameter d + 1 to violate Non-Separability
on security parameter d.7
1. B calls A(1d+1;1n;k0;fKigi2I0) and answers A's queries VerAS(m;;Kj) as follows:
(a) Initialization. Set S0 and S1 to ;.
(b) Check sj. If sj = ?, then return ?.
(c) Key Discovery. For each key pair (k;z) in k, if roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds, then add k to
set S1; otherwise add k to set S0.
(d) Check Opposite Keys. If roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) holds, then iterate over each key k in S0.
Otherwise iterate over keys in S1. Use oracle access to call CheckIR(k;Kj) on each such
key k, and return ? if CheckIR(;Kj) ever returns ?. Set sj to ? when returning ?.
(e) If roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) holds, then return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
2. When A returns m and , run Key Discovery as before to get S0 and S1. Return K = S1
and K0 = S0.
It remains to show that this algorithm correctly simulates the operation of VerAS(m;;Kj).
There are only three possible return values from the verication oracle VerAS(m;;Kj): 0, 1, and
?. We consider each case in turn:
 VerAS(m;;Kj) = 0. In this case, the denition of VerAS states that, for all key pairs (k;z)
in Kj, roweq(m;;(k;z)) will not hold. So, all of j's keys will be placed in S0. Further,
roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) will also fail to hold, so Check Opposite Keys will iterate over S1. Thus,
none of j's keys will be passed to CheckIR(;Kj), so CheckIR(;Kj) will not return ?, which
means the simulation will not return ?. Since roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) does not hold, the simu-
lation returns 0, as required.
 VerAS(m;;Kj) = 1. In this case, the denition of VerAS states that, for all key pairs
(k;z) in Kj, roweq(m;;(k;z)) holds. So, all of j's keys will be placed in S1. Further,
roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) must hold, so Check Opposite Keys will iterate over S0. Thus, none of
j's keys will be passed to CheckIR(;Kj), so CheckIR(;Kj) will not return ?, which means
that the simulation will not return ?. Since roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) holds for all (k;z) 2 Kj,
the simulation returns 1, as required.
 VerAS(m;;Kj) = ?. The denition of VerAS provides two cases in which a verier might
return ?.
First, it might be that vj 6= ?. In this case, the denition of VerAS states that there
must be some key pairs (kr;zr) and (kr0;zr0) in Kj such that roweq(m;;(kr;zr)) holds
and roweq(m;;(kr0;zr0)) does not hold. So, (kr;zr) is put in S1, and (kr0;zr0) is put in S0.
7The security parameter is now d + 1 instead of d, because there are now dn + n = (d + 1)n keys.
12If roweq(m;;(k
j;z
j)) holds, then Check Opposite Keys will iterate over S0, which contains
kr0, so CheckIR(kr0;Kj) will be called and will return ?. If not, then Check Opposite Keys
will iterate over S1, which contains kr, so CheckIR(kr;Kj) will be called and will return ?.
Either way, the simulation returns ?, as required. And in both cases, the simulation sets sj
to ?.
Second, it might be that vj = ?. By denition of VerAS, this means that VerAS(;;Kj) must
have previously returned ?. This means that sj has already been set to ?, by induction. So,
the simulation returns ? in the step Check sj, as required.
Thus, B simulates A's oracle calls correctly. When A succeeds, the denition of Transferability
implies that there is some pair j;j0 2 I   I0 such that the values of m and  returned by A satisfy
VerAS(m;;Kj) = 1 and VerAS(m;;Kj0) = 0. Therefore, roweq(m;;(k;z)) must hold for every
(k;z) 2 Kj and for no (k;z) 2 Kj0, which means that Kj  S1 = K and Kj0  S0 = K0, as
required. And K\K0 = ; holds by denition. Values sj and sj0 are not set to ?, since VerAS(;;Kj)
and VerAS(;;Kj0) never returned ?. B succeeds with the same non-negligible probability as A.
Note that the constructed adversary B in the proof of Lemma 4 needs the known key pairs
to simulate the operation of the verication function. But known key pairs are not needed in the
construction itself. This dierence in the use of known keys leads to the dierence in security
parameters between B and A.
The following theorem uses the previous results to show that Atomic Signatures is a Strong
1-MVS scheme.
Theorem 5. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Atomic Signatures is a Strong 1-MVS
scheme.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that Atomic Signatures satises 1-Completeness and Strong Unforgeability
if the MAC is a pseudorandom function. And Lemma 4 and Theorem 3 together imply that Atomic
Signatures satises Transferability. So, Atomic Signatures is a Strong 1-MVS scheme.
The reduction in Lemma 4 adds one key per verier to the set of keys used in Atomic Signatures.
So, the value d = O

log

n2
0

computed in x3.2 using the probability 0 of a compromised signer
being able to create a split tag gives a value of d that is 1 lower than the value needed for Atomic
Signatures. But this does not aect the asymptotic complexity of the scheme: Atomic Signatures
can be computed by generating a vector of dn MACs in time O(jmjdn) and solving the factored
matrix equation in time O(n2d2) = O

n2 log2

n2
0

. So, the total asymptotic complexity of
generating a tag is O

jmjnlog(n2
0 ) + n2 log2

n2
0

4 Chain Signatures
Chain Signatures is a -MVS scheme that creates tags consisting of vectors of subtags. Each subtag
contains the output of a MAC on the concatenation of previous subtags.
Key generation algorithm GenCS(1d;1n) produces n known keys k1 = k
1;k
2;:::;k
n and dn
unknown keys k2 = hk1;k2;:::;kdni, where each key is an element of f0;1gb. GenCS(1d;1n) then
sets k = (k1;k2) and creates n vectors K1;K2;:::;Kn. A vector Kj contains k
j as well as a set
of d keys chosen uniformly at random from k2 such that vectors K1, K2, :::, Kn are disjoint.
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Figure 1: The structure of a signed message using Chain Signatures
SignCS(m;;k) produces8 a vector C;d(m) consisting of  sections, each divided into two
components: we call component 1 the known-key component and component 2 the unknown-key
component. Component 1 contains n subtags, and component 2 contains dn subtags, so each section
contains (d+1)n subtags. We write C;d(m)[r;c;j] for the jth subtag in the cth component of the
rth section of the tag generated by Chain Signatures for m and .9 We use the natural lexicographic
ordering on triples (r;c;j) used to index the subtags of Chain Signatures.10 The value of a subtag
is computed recursively as the MAC of the concatenation of m with the subtags in all previous
components:
C;d(m)[r;c;j] , MAC(m jj
(t;t0;t00)<(r;c;1)
C;d(m)[t;t0;t00];kc[j]) (3)
Subtag j in component c of section r is said to be supported if the value of this subtag is
identical to the MAC of the message and all previous components under key kc[j]. Figure 1 shows
the structure of a signed message using Chain Signatures.
Verication algorithm VerCS(;;Kj) keeps state vj to record whether it has ever been called
with a message and tag that indicate that the signer is compromised. When called with a message
m and tag , the verication algorithm checks all the subtags of j in  to see if there is a supported
subtag that follows a non-supported subtag. If so, then verication concludes that the signer is
compromised. And if not, then verication returns the value of the highest section in which it
found a supported subtag.
More precisely, the verication algorithm works as follows, where 0 is the value of the highest
section in which verication found a supported subtag for j:
 If vj = ?, then return ?.
 Otherwise, if each known-key component below c contains exactly one supported subtag for
j, and each unknown-key component below c contains d supported subtags for j, then return
0.
 If no component contains supported subtags for j, then return 0.
 Otherwise, some component below c contains a non-supported subtag for j, so return ? and
set vj to ?.
8The denition of MVS schemes does not allow signing algorithm Sign(;k)
CS to take three parameters. To get
around this diculty, when Chain Signatures is considered as a -MVS scheme for some  2 N, we dene Sign
CS(m;k)
to mean Sign
CS(m;;k).
9Note that we can compute the oset of C
;d(m)[r;c;j] in this tag as (d + 1)n(r   1) + (c   1)n + j   1.
10Note that sections, components, and subtags indexed by our triples are numbered starting at 1 rather than the
more customary value of 0.
14Remark 4.1.
The alternation of known-key and unknown-key components in tags generated by Chain
Signatures is critical to the security of the algorithm. If a supported subtag t in one
component follows a non-supported subtag t0 in another component, then there must
be some pair of adjacent components c and c0 such that c0 comes before c, there is a
non-supported subtag in c0, and there is a supported subtag in c. Since known-key
and unknown-key components alternate, exactly one of c and c0 must be a known-key
component. So, whenever verication returns ?, there is a known-key component and
an adjacent unknown-key component that justify this return value.
A simpler|but wrong|version of Chain Signatures would not include known-key com-
ponents. This would give a compromised signer an easy way to violate Transferability.
For example, suppose compromised signer i creates a tag  in which all subtags in the
rst    1 sections are supported. However, in section  of tag , only one subtag is
supported. The key for this subtag is owned by some verier, say j. So, verication at
j will return , and all other veriers will return    1. This reveals that j owns the
key for this subtag. And i can perform this attack on each key to learn its attribution;
i can create split tags once it knows the attribution of enough keys.
This attack fails in Chain Signatures due to the known-key components. Suppose that
compromised signer i creates a tag  in which all subtags in the rst    1 sections
are supported. The rst component in section  is a known-key component. So, if i
makes one of the subtags in the known-key component supported and all other subtags
in section  non-supported, then j will return , and all other veriers will return  1.
This reveals the attribution of j's known key. But the attribution of j's known key is
known, so the adversary does not learn anything new about the keys.
Another variant on the same attack would be for the compromised signer to make all
the subtags in the known-key component supported. But then, no matter which subtags
are supported in the unknown-key component of section , all veriers will return ,
since all nd a supported subtag in this section.
A more complex variant of this attack would be to make some subtags in the known-
key component supported and some non-supported. Also, at least one subtag in the
unknown-key component of section  must be made supported (otherwise, the adversary
learns nothing, as discussed above). But now there is some probability that there is a
verier j0 that has a non-supported tag in the known-key component and a supported
tag in the unknown-key component. This verier will return ? on . So, if the adversary
requests verication of  from a verier j0, and j0 does not return ?, then the adversary
learns that j0 does not own the key used for the subtag in the unknown-keys.
Attacks in which some veriers might return ? yield information to the adversary,
but they also risk revealing to veriers that the signer is compromised. If too many
veriers learn that the signer is compromised, then Transferability cannot be violated,
since violations m and  depend on veriers j and j0 such that Ver(m;;Kj) 6= ? and
Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ?. Our reduction below from Idealized Random Keys shows how to
choose a value of d such that, with high probability, compromised signers never learn
enough information to create split tags without revealing themselves as compromised
to too many veriers.
15Remark 4.2.
Chain Signatures as described above is expensive to compute; generating a tag costs
O(dn(jmj+dn)), since inputs to the MAC grow linearly in the length of the tag. Figure
9 in Appendix D gives an algorithm that reduces the cost to O(jmj + dnlog) using
collision-resistant hash functions. Modied proofs of -Completeness, Unforgeability,
and Non-Accusability follow the description of this more ecient version.
A -MVS scheme must satisfy -Completeness, Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, and Trans-
ferability. We prove that Chain Signatures is a -MVS scheme for  2 N>0 using two lemmas. The
rst shows that Chain Signatures satises -Completeness, Unforgeability, and Non-Accusability;
the second reduces Non-Separability of Ideal Random Keys to Transferability of Chain Signa-
tures. Then, Theorem 3, along with the second lemma, implies that Chain Signatures satises
Transferability.
Note that Chain Signatures does not satisfy Strong Unforgeability. Any adversary that receives
a tag  for message m that causes verier j to return  > 1 can produce a new tag 0 that causes
verier j to return  1. All the adversary needs to do is to remove the last section, since tags for
earlier sections do not depend on the last section. The previous    1 sections consist entirely of
supported subtags, so verier j will return  1 for m and 0. But the adversary never received 0
from its signing oracle, so m and 0 together violate Strong Unforgeability.
Lemma 6. For any  2 N>0, if the MAC satises CTA Unforgeability, then Chain Signatures
satises -Completeness, Unforgeability, and Non-Accusability.
Proof. -Completeness. This follows directly from the denition: all subtags are supported by
construction, so VerCS(m;SignCS(m;;k);Kj) = .
Unforgeability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that adversary A violates Unforge-
ability for some I0  I with probability 0. We construct an adversary B that violates CTA
Unforgeability of the MAC (for some key k0) with probability 0=n. B chooses a key k
t uniformly
at random from the n known keys and generates a new instance of Chain Signatures by calling
GenCS and replacing calls to MAC(;k
t) with (i) calls to B's MAC oracle when signing and (ii) B's
verication oracle when verifying. When A succeeds, returning m and , the denition of Unforge-
ability states that there is some j 2 I  I0 for which VerCS(m;;Kj) > 0. This means j must have
(at least) a supported subtag in component 1 of section 1.
B returns m as its message and [1;1;t] as its tag. With probability 1=n, we have t = j, since
t was chosen uniformly at random and independently of j. And MAC(m;k0) = [1;1;t], because
[1;1;t] = [1;1;j] is the only subtag for j in component 1 of section 1, so it must be supported.
The unique length of inputs to MACs for each component implies the only component for which B
could have requested m from its MAC oracle is the very rst. This request could only have been
made if A requested m from its signing oracle, which does not occur by denition.
So, B never requested m from its MAC oracle, and B succeeds in violating CTA Unforgeability
with probability 0=n.
Non-Accusability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose some adversary A violates Non-
Accusabilityfor some I0  I with probability 0. Similar to the proof of Unforgeability, we construct
a B that violates CTA Unforgeability of the MAC by building a new instance of Chain Signatures
and calling A. Instead of choosing a key at random from the known keys, however, B chooses a
key kt from the union of the known keys and the unknown keys. When A succeeds and returns
m and , the denition of Non-Accusability states that there must be some j in I   I0 such that
VerCS(m;;Kj) returns ?, which means that there is some supported subtag for j that takes as
input a non-supported subtag for j in some component r.
16With probability 1=((d + 1)n), key kt was used to compute this supported subtag, since t was
chosen uniformly at random and independently of the choice of the non-supported subtag. In this
case, B returns this supported subtag in component r as tag 0 and the message m concatenated
with all components before component r as message m0. The length of m0 means that it could
only have been input to B's MAC oracle in component r. But since it contains a non-supported
subtag, it never would have been input to a MAC in B's simulation of the signing oracle, since only
concatenations of supported subtags are input to the MAC oracle in B's simulation, by construction.
So, m0 has never been requested from B's MAC oracle.
Thus, m0 and 0 violate CTA Unforgeability of the MAC with probability 0=((d + 1)n), which
is non-negligible.
To prove that Chain Signatures satises Transferability, we reduce from Idealized Random Keys.
This reduction relies on the following characterization of tags: for each verier j, message m,
and tag pair , there is a highest known-key component of  containing a supported subtag; we
call this known-key component highSup(m;;j;k). And there is a lowest known-key component
containing a non-supported subtag for j; we call this known-key component lowNonSup(m;;j;k).
Verication returns ? when a supported subtag follows a non-supported subtag for a given verier.
As argued in Remark 4.1, at least one such pair of supported and non-supported subtags in this case
always involves a known-key component. The following lemma shows that these special known-key
components indicate when to return ?.
Lemma 7. For verier j, if the state vj is not ?, then VerCS(m;;Kj) returns ? if and only if
there is, in , a non-supported subtag for j in a component below highSup(m;;j;k) or there is a
supported subtag for j in a component above lowNonSup(m;;j;k).
Proof. The \if" direction trivially follows from the denition of VerCS: if a supported subtag for
verier j, message m, and tag  follows a non-supported subtag for j, then VerCS(m;;Kj) returns
?.
We prove the \only if" direction by the contrapositive. Let HS = highSup(m;;j;k), and let
LN = lowNonSup(m;;j;k). Suppose that all non-supported subtags for j are in HS or higher
components|in fact, all non-supported tags for j must be in higher components, since there is only
one subtag for j in HS, and this subtag is supported. Suppose further that all supported tags for
j are in LN or lower components|by the same argument as for HS, all supported subtags for j
must actually be in lower components than LN.
We will show that VerCS(m;;Kj) cannot return ?. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that
it does. Then, since vj is not ?, the denition of VerCS states that there is a pair of keys k1 and
k2 associated with j and components rN and rS such that rN < rS holds, the subtag generated
with k1 in component rN is not supported, and the subtag generated with k2 in component rS
is supported. This happens because the verication algorithm returns ? only if a non-supported
subtag occurs in a lower component than a supported subtag.
By the argument above, rN > HS and rS < LN both hold. So, HS < rN < rS < LN holds;
see Figure 7 for a depiction of these components. This means that there are at least two distinct
components rN and rS between HS and LN, so one of the components between HS and LN,
say rK, must be a known-key component. Since rK < LN holds, the denition of LN requires
that j's subtag in rK be supported. But, since rK > HS holds, the denition of HS requires that
j's subtag in rK not be supported. This is a contradiction, since rK only has one subtag for j, so
VerCS(m;;Kj) cannot return ?.
17HS < rN < rS < LN
non-supported
rK
supported
Figure 2: Components used in the proof of Lemma 7
Remark 4.3.
It may seem like a more natural construction for Chain Signatures would make the
input to the MAC for each subtag be the concatenation of the message and all previous
subtags, instead of the message and all subtags in previous components. But Lemma
7 no longer holds in this version of Chain Signatures. The problem is that a non-
supported subtag for some verier j could be followed by a supported subtag for j in
the same unknown-key component. In this case, there is no contradiction in the proof of
Lemma 7. This means that the highest known-key component with a supported subtag
and the lowest known-key component with a non-supported subtag are not sucient
to simulate verication in the simpler version of Chain Signatures; Lemma 7 is critical
in the reduction from Non-Separability of Idealized Random Keys to Transferability of
Chain Signatures.
We now proceed to show the following lemma.
Lemma 8. If Idealized Random Keys satises Non-Separability, then Chain Signatures satises
Transferability.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: we construct an adversary B that violates Non-Separability
of Idealized Random Keys using an adversary A that violates Transferability of Chain Signatures.
The reduction for Transferability of Atomic Signatures relies on known keys that are added for the
proof. For Chain Signatures, however, known keys are already part of the construction, so they do
not need to be added for the proof.
B is given k for Idealized Random Keys and generates n keys to serve as the known keys for
Chain Signatures. B then forms k0 consisting of k and these known keys to pass to A.
Since B knows all the keys, B can check each subtag in each component to see if it is supported. B
divides the keys into two sets for each component c based on whether or not the MAC using a key in
c is supported; we call these sets supported and non-supported, respectively. B then uses the known
keys to decide on which sets to call CheckIR(;Kj) to simulate a given call to VerCS(m;;Kj), as
follows.
1. B nds lowNonSup(m;;j;k) and calls CheckIR(;Kj) on all keys in all supported sets for
higher components.
2. Similarly, B nds  = highSup(m;;j;k) and calls CheckIR(;Kj) on all keys in all non-
supported sets for lower components.
3. If any of the calls to CheckIR(;Kj) return ?, then B returns ?,
4. Otherwise, B returns , since verication for j returns the value of the highest section that
contains a supported subtag for j.
18This strategy simulates VerCS(m;;Kj) perfectly. To see why, we consider the possible return
values of VerCS(m;;Kj). When VerCS(m;;Kj) returns 0, there are no supported subtags for j,
so the simulation will also return 0.
When VerCS(m;;Kj) returns  > 0, there must be some supported subtag for j in section ,
and no supported subtags in higher sections. And since verication did not return ?, all subtags
for j in lower components must also be supported. Since the known-key subtag for j is the rst
subtag for j in section , it must also be supported; this means that the simulation will return .
By Lemma 7, the simulation is also correct when VerCS(m;;Kj) returns ?. Note that Lemma
7 implies that CheckIR(;Kj) in B's simulation will only return ? when VerCS(;;Kj) does, since
the simulation calls CheckIR(;Kj) only on keys for subtags that match the description in the
hypothesis of Lemma 7.
When A succeeds, returning a message m and tag , the denition of Transferability im-
plies that there is some pair j;j0 2 I   I0 and a section 0 such that VerCS(m;;Kj) = 0 and
VerCS(m;;Kj0) < 0   1. B nds j, j0, and 0 by simulating the verication function as before
for each verier. Then B returns the supported subtags in the unknown-key component of section
0   1 as K and the non-supported subtags in the unknown-key component of section 0   1 as
K0. This strategy always succeeds, since a violation of Transferability in section 0 for veriers j
and j0 means that the subtags for j must be supported in the unknown-key component of section
0   1 and the subtags for j0 must not be supported. Thus, B succeeds with the same probability
as A.
Just as in the proof of Lemma 4 for Atomic Signatures, the adversary B in the proof of Lemma 8
depends critically on the known keys in its simulation of the verication oracle. But, unlike Atomic
Signatures, the known keys are essential to the construction of Chain Signatures, as shown in
Lemma 7 and Remark 4.3.
The following theorem uses the previous results to show that Chain Signatures is a -MVS
scheme.
Theorem 9. For any  2 N>0, if the MAC satises CTA Unforgeability, then Chain Signatures is
a -MVS scheme.
Proof. Lemma 6 shows that Chain Signatures satises -Completeness, Unforgeability, and Non-
Accusability if the MAC satises CTA Unforgeability. Lemma 8 shows that Non-Separability
of Idealized Random Keys implies Transferability of Chain Signatures. Since Theorem 3 shows
that Non-Separability of Idealized Random Keys holds, it follows that Chain Signatures satises
Transferability.
The reduction in Lemma 8 shows that the value of the security parameter d is set to d + 1 for
Chain Signatures to have the same security as Idealized Random Keys has for d. However, the
asymptotic complexity of d is the same, so the value d = O

log

n2
0

computed in x3.2 using
the probability 0 of a compromised signer being able to create a split tag is the same for Chain
Signatures as for Idealized Random Keys. This means that Chain Signatures can be computed in
time O(jmj + dnlog) = O

jmj + nlog

n2
0

log

.
5 Performance
We implemented Atomic Signatures (AS) and Chain Signatures (CS) in C using OpenSSL 0.9.8e
[21]. Using a hash function h, we compute a MAC for a message m and key k by setting MAC(m;k) =
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Figure 3: Execution time for generating Chain Signatures ( = 2 64)
0 50 100
0
1
2
3
Number of Servers
T
i
m
e
(
m
s
) RSA (2048)
RSA (1024)
DSA (1024)
CS ( = 3)
CS ( = 2)
CS ( = 1)
Figure 4: Execution time for checking Chain Signatures ( = 2 64)
h(h(m)jjk), as suggested by Canetti et al. [6] for cases where many MACs must be computed for the
same message. In our implementation, h is SHA-1 [25].11 All shared keys comprise 160 bits, and
the output of the MAC is also 160 bits, so parameter b = 160.12 We use all optimizations described
in the paper and the appendices: pseudorandom functions are used to generate a factored matrix
for Atomic Signatures, and hashing is used as in the pseudo-code of Figure 8 in Appendix D to
reduce the running time of Chain Signatures. The probability 0 that a compromised signer will be
able to create a split tag is set to 2 64, except where otherwise stated. Parameter  is considered
up to  = 3, since this is a common value for protocols used in implementing distributed services.
All tests were run on a 2.13GHz Pentium M over Gentoo Linux kernel 2.6.22-gentoo-r9. RSA
and DSA measurements were made for OpenSSL by running the commands openssl speed rsa
and openssl speed dsa on this system. Each value represents a mean over 1000 runs; the error
gives the sample standard deviation around this mean.
The performance of signature algorithms depends on three factors: the execution time for
generating and checking tags, the tag size, and the key infrastructure required. Figures 3 and 4
show the execution time for generating and checking Chain Signatures. In Figure 3, for  = 3,
Chain Signatures can generate tags faster than 1024-bit RSA for n  50 and faster than 2048-bit
RSA for all n < 100, which is more than sucient for many applications. Figure 4 shows that
checking Chain Signatures (for  = 3 and  = 2 64) is faster than 2048-bit RSA for n < 75. Higher
probabilities of split tags may be acceptable in some contexts and lead to faster generation and
checking of signatures.
Atomic Signatures costs O(d2n2), so tags that use many random keys are more expensive to
11Under the assumption that SHA-1 is pseudorandom, this MAC satises the properties required for our proof,
according to Bellare et al. [2].
12Atomic Signatures requires that an adversary only be able to violate Strong Unforgeabilitywith a given probability

0
0. The proof of Lemma 1 bounds 
0
0 by poly(d;n)=2
b, but the exact value of the polynomial factor poly(d;n) depends
on Lemmas 10{12, which provide asymptotic, rather than concrete, bounds. So, we instead choose b to satisfy

0
0 < 1=2
b, since the polynomial factor will make only a small dierence in the choice of b for small values of n and d.
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Figure 5: Execution time to generate Atomic Signatures for 6 veriers and dierent probabilities
of generating a split tag
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Figure 6: Execution time to check Atomic Signatures for 6 veriers and dierent probabilities of
generating a split tag
generate; the eciency depends on the probability that a signer can generate split tags. Figures
5 and 6 show how generating and checking times vary for 6 veriers and dierent probabilities of
creating a split tag. Atomic Signatures can generate tags for 6 veriers faster than 2048-bit RSA
for probabilities down to about 2 55. But checking tags generated by Atomic Signatures is more
expensive for probabilities below about 2 25.
Even though execution time for generating and checking tags based on the schemes in this paper
is sometimes lower than RSA and DSA, tag size for our signature algorithms is signicantly larger.
Chain Signatures and Atomic Signatures require signicant space even for small n, since the size of
the signature depends linearly on d. For instance, for 6 veriers,  = 2 64, and  = 3, generating
signatures takes about 581s, which is fast, but the size of a tag is 13680 bytes. These sizes
are acceptable in circumstances where signature transfer time is negligible|for instance, between
processes in operating systems, or across local-area networks using Gigabit Ethernet switches.
Key-management infrastructure costs for Chain Signatures and Atomic Signatures are also
relatively high, since each verier must store O(dn) keys. For instance, with n = 4 and  = 2 64,
each verier must share d = 36 keys with the signer. And if n = 36 with the same value of , then
d becomes 40. Rekeying requires that signer i not learn with which verier it shares a given key. If
the keys for a single verier j were replaced without replacing keys for other veriers, then i would
learn which of its keys correspond to j. Even if keys for some subset of the veriers were replaced,
then signer i would gain some information about which keys correspond to which veriers. Thus,
all keys must be replaced simultaneously.
These performance results show that in some contexts, MVS schemes have comparable, and
sometimes even better, performance than digital signature schemes. Unlike these schemes, however,
MVS schemes are proven secure only assuming the existence of pseudorandom functions, whereas
these digital signature schemes are only known to be secure in the heuristic random oracle model.
21The results of our experiments show that it is possible to have provable security and eciency for
signature schemes.
6 Related Work
Many authentication schemes use symmetric message authentication codes and try to achieve prop-
erties similar to digital signature schemes. But none is able to handle an unbounded number of
adaptive queries. We succeed by using a unusual secret-key setup along with state kept by veriers.
Previous work achieves dierent properties.
-Limited Transferability. Chaum and Roijakkers [9] were the rst to suggest constructing
tags that could be transferred a nite number of times. Their scheme allows signed messages to
be transferred only once. Ptzmann and Waidner [22] followed with a construction, called pseu-
dosignatures, that is somewhat similar to Chain Signatures: it creates tags that can be transferred
an arbitrary xed number of times. Both the work of Chaum and Roijakkers and Ptzmann and
Waidner provide unconditional security.
Like MVS schemes, pseudosignatures depend on a secret-key setup; multiple keys are shared
between the signer and each verier, and the signer cannot attribute keys to veriers. However,
pseudosignature tag size is directly proportional to the number of queries an adversary can submit
to a verication oracle. Even if pseudosignatures were implemented with computationally-secure
MACs, they would only be able to tolerate a xed number of verication queries.
Arbitrary Transferability with Unconditional Security. Many schemes have been proposed
for tags that are both unconditionally secure and can be transferred an arbitrary number of times.
For instance, recent work [17, 26, 24] generalizes Multi-Receiver Authentication (MRA) codes
(invented by Desmedt et al. [11]) to unconditionally-secure polynomial codes that satisfy similar
properties to Transferability. These constructions are called MRA3 codes. MRA3 codes constrain
the number of signing and verication oracle queries as well as the number of possible signatures
that a signer can create, since each signature leaks information.
Johansson [18] proposes a dierent unconditionally-secure authentication scheme; it is similar
in form to Atomic Signatures: signers and veriers each have secret keys that are used to solve a
matrix equation. But unlike Atomic Signatures, each signature in Johansson's scheme provides a
set of linear equations over the signer's secret keys, so keys must be refreshed after a xed number
of signatures.
Computational Security. Other schemes similar to MVS have been designed for particular
protocols in the computational model. For instance, MACs are sometimes considered shared-key
signatures, despite not satisfying Transferability. And in some fault-tolerant distributed systems
(e.g., Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [7]), vectors of MACs are used to improve pro-
tocol speed over digital signatures.
Aiyer et al. [1] present schemes in which servers use MACs to generate tags having similar prop-
erties to digital signatures. Unlike digital signatures and MVS schemes, however, their construction
relies on communication between clients and servers to produce and verify signed messages. And
they also require that no more than 1=3 of the servers in the system be compromised.
In a distributed setting where at most t signers may be compromised, Lamport [19] suggests (in
a set of slides on Byzantine Paxos) collecting (+1)t+1 tags from dierent signers. A signer in the
scheme creates  vectors consisting of n subtags each, where each subtag of each vector contains a
22MAC of all the vectors before it, along with the message. This scheme does not provide adaptive
security, since an adversary with oracle access to the signing functionality can create a split tag by
the following procedure. The adversary requests a tag for m and receives . Then the adversary
corrupts  to 0 by overwriting some subtags with random strings and requests a tag for m jj 0,
receiving a tag 00. The tag 0 jj 00 is split for m, since all subtags in 00 are supported, but some
subtags in 0 are not supported.
Canetti et al. [6] propose a multicast MAC scheme that is closely related to the schemes in this
paper. In this scheme, a collection of keys is associated with each verier; keys are chosen randomly
from a large set. Signers create a tag for a message m by generating a MAC of m for each key they
know. The algorithm distributes keys at random with probability 1
t+1 if up to t veriers may collude
to try to forge tags. Keys in this protocol may thus be shared by more than one verier.13 Canetti
et al. show that given  > 0, having e(t+1)log(1
) keys in total suces to guarantee that tags can
be forged only with probability less than . However, these tags do not satisfy Transferability, since
an adversary can create a new tag from a correctly-signed tag by corrupting one subtag. This new
tag will be accepted by some veriers and not by others.
Summary
This paper shows that MVS schemes provide lower-cost authentication than traditional digital
signature schemes while guaranteeing similar properties. Achieving these properties in Atomic
Signatures and Chain Signatures requires implementing a specialized secret-key setup. The setup
encodes an asymmetric relationship between the signer and veriers, since veriers know which
keys are owned by which signers, but signers do not know which keys are owned by which veriers;
the proof of Transferability depends critically on this asymmetry. Asymmetry in knowledge about
keys thus appears to be fundamental for achieving Transferability, both in digital signature schemes
and MVS schemes.
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A Lemmas for Strong Unforgeability of Atomic Signatures
We prove several lemmas that together simplify the proof of Strong Unforgeability of Atomic
Signatures to the case where all but one verier is compromised, no verier queries are allowed for
an adversary, and MAC(;k) is replaced by a random function vk().
25Lemma 10. If Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability when all but one verier is com-
promised, then Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability.
Proof. Suppose A violates Strong Unforgeability using an arbitrary set I0  I of compromised
veriers. We construct an adversary B that violates Strong Unforgeability when all but one verier,
say verier j, is compromised. B is given the keys for all veriers but j and is given oracle access
to a verication oracle for j as well as a signing oracle. B maps its veriers randomly to veriers
in the simulation for A; this does not change the view of A, since keys are chosen uniformly at
random. B runs A and simulates its oracle queries as follows.
1. B calls A(1d;1n;fKigi2I0).
2. When A makes a signing oracle query, B passes the query to its signing oracle and returns
its response.
3. When A makes a verication oracle query for verier j0, B calls its verication oracle if j0 = j,
and otherwise uses its knowledge of the keys for j0 to perform verication for j0 and return
the result.
4. When A returns m and , B checks that VerAS(m;;Kj) 6= 0. If so, then B returns m and
, and otherwise, B aborts.
When A returns m;, there is some j0 2 I  I0 such that VerAS(m;;Kj0) 6= 0, and there a 1=n
chance that j = j0, since the position of j in I  I0 was chosen independently of the view of A. So,
B succeeds with probability =n if A succeeds with probability .
Lemma 11. If Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability when no verier queries are al-
lowed to an adversary and all but one verier is compromised, then Atomic Signatures satises
Strong Unforgeability when all but one verier is compromised.
Proof. Given an adversary A that succeeds with non-negligible probability with polynomial bound
p(n) on its number of verication queries, we can construct a new adversary B that succeeds with
non-negligible probability without using any verier queries. Assume, without loss of generality,
that A always makes a verier query for the pair m and  that it outputs.14
B simulates verier queries from A for a message-tag pair m,  as follows: if m has been
requested already from the signing oracle, which returned , then return 1. If m has not been
requested from the signing oracle, or the signing oracle returned anything but , then return 0. B
stores each verication query. When A outputs m and , B chooses one of the stored verication
queries m0, 0 uniformly at random, and outputs it.
A either uses more than one verication query (the nal one) or it does not. If it does not, then
B succeeds every time A does, since B always chooses the one query that A made. And this is the
value that A returned.
If A uses more than one verication query, then either some verication queries (other than
the last) that were not received from the signing oracle should have returned a value other than
0, or all verication queries (other than the last) that were not received from the signing oracle
should have returned 0. If all except the last should return 0, then B succeeds only when it returns
the m and  from the last query. A succeeds with non-negligible probability  and makes at most
14If this is not the case, then there is another adversary D that succeeds with the same probability as A but
performs the extra query. D runs A, and when A returns m and , D queries m and  from the verication oracle
before returning them.
26p(n) queries, so B succeeds, in this case, with probability greater than or equal to =p(n), which is
non-negligible.
If some queries not received from the signing oracle should return a value other than 0, then there
is no guarantee about the success probability of A, since B no longer simulates all of the verication
queries correctly. But there is still a maximum bound of p(n) on the number of verication queries,
and there is at least one query that caused B to fail to simulate the verication queries correctly.
The denition of B guarantees that this query violates Strong Unforgeability, since the query was
not received from the signing oracle. This means that the probability of B returning a query m
and  that violates Strong Unforgeability is at least 1=p(n), which is non-negligible.
So, B always succeeds in violating Strong Unforgeability with non-negligible probability.
For simplicity in stating the next lemmas, call the version of Atomic Signatures in the hypothesis
of Lemma 11 verier-free Atomic Signatures, and call Atomic Signatures when no verier queries
are allowed, all but one verier is compromised, and MAC(;k) is replaced by a random function
vk() verier-free random Atomic Signatures.
Lemma 12. If MAC is a pseudorandom function, then if verier-free random Atomic Signatures
satises Strong Unforgeability, then verier-free Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that verier-free random Atomic Signatures satises Strong Un-
forgeability, but verier-free Atomic Signatures does not. This means that there is an adversary
A that succeeds with non-negligible probability  when interacting with oracles that use MAC(;k)
to answer signing queries, and, by assumption, succeeds with only negligible probability 0 when
interacting with oracles that use random functions vk() to answer signing queries.
Now construct a sequence of hybrids as follows: Hi uses vkj() instead of MAC(;kj) for keys kj
such that 1  j  i, then uses MAC(;kj) for the remaining keys kj such that i+1  j  dn. Note
that H0 is verier-free Atomic Signatures, and Hdn is verier-free random Atomic Signatures.
A standard hybrid argument shows that there must be an i such that A succeeds with non-
negligible probability on hybrid Hi and and succeeds with negligible probability on hybrid Hi+1.
But then there exists a algorithm D that can distinguish a random function from MAC, since the
only dierence between hybrids Hi and Hi+1 is that Hi uses MAC in its i + 1st position, whereas
Hi+1 uses a random function in this position.
D sets up an instance of the hybrid Atomic Signatures scheme using its oracle (which is either
a pseudorandom or a random function) in the i+1st position. Then D calls A on this instance and
returns 1 if A succeeds and 0 if A fails. Since A succeeds with non-negligible probability when there
is a pseudorandom function in the i + 1st position and succeeds only with negligible probability
when there is a random function in the i+1st position, D succeeds in distinguishing pseudorandom
from random functions with non-negligible probability. This contradicts the hypothesis that MAC
is a pseudorandom function.
B Non-Compromised Signers
The constructions of MVS schemes in this paper allow the signer to be compromised. But there
are places where it is reasonable to make stronger assumptions. For instance, when it is sound to
assume that the signer is not compromised, we can simplify our constructions signicantly. This
assumption holds in some common contexts: for example, in operating systems, the OS itself is
trusted by the processes and sometimes signs messages (e.g., capabilities) to processes.
When the signer is not compromised, Transferability can be weakened to the following:
27Weak Transferability. For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
 such that for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);
(m;)   ASign(;k);fVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0(1d;fKigi2I0) :
(9j;j0 2 I   I0 :

Ver(m;;Kj)   Ver(m;;Kj0)
  > 1)]  (d;n):
Weak Transferability implies that even an adversary that controls an arbitrary subset of veriers
and has signing and verication oracles (for the other veriers) cannot produce message and tag
pair on which two correct veriers will produce values that dier by more than one. Notice that
the adversary in this case does not control the signer.
We call -MVS scheme that satises -Completeness, Unforgeability, and Weak Transferability
a Weak -MVS scheme.
B.1 Known-Key Atomic Signatures
Known-Key Atomic Signatures (KA) is a Weak 1-MVS scheme based on Atomic Signatures, and
it only uses one key for each verier. KA follows exactly the algorithms for Atomic Signatures for
the case d = 1. But this means that veriers can never return ?, since either their single instance
of equation (2) is satised or it is not.
Theorem 13. If the MAC is a pseudorandom function, then Known-Key Atomic Signatures is a
Weak 1-MVS scheme.
Proof. 1-Completeness. Same reasons as Atomic Signatures.
Strong Unforgeability. This follows from exactly the same proof as for Atomic Signatures.
The only dierence is that the Union Bound does not include a factor of d, since each verier only
has 1 key rather than d.
Weak Transferability. We show that Strong Unforgeability implies Weak Transferability.
As we have already shown that Known-Key Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability, this
implies that it also satises Weak Transferability.
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that there is an adversary A that can violate Weak
Transferability with non-negligible probability . A uses access to a signing oracle and verication
oracles to produce a message m and tag  such that for some pair j;j0 2 I   I0, it holds that
jVerKA(m;;Kj)   VerKA(m;;Kj0)j > 1. This means that one verier must return 1 and the
other must return 0. Without loss of generality, assume that j returns 1 and j0 returns 0.
We now produce an adversary B that violates Strong Unforgeability. B is given the same signing
and verication oracles as A and must produce a message and tag that it has never received from
the signing oracle but causes some verier j 2 I   I0 to produce a value that is not 0. B simply
calls A, simulates A's oracle calls by passing them to B's oracles, and returns the values of m and
 returned by A.
Since verication for j returns 1, the values m and  will suce to violate Strong Unforgeability
as long as m and  were never received from B's signing oracle. But the same values of m and  also
cause j0 2 I  I0 to return 0. And 1-Completeness implies that no message and tag returned from
the signing oracle ever causes a correct verier to return 0. So, m and  were not received from
the signing oracle, and B succeeds in violating Strong Unforgeability. So, Strong Unforgeability
implies Weak Transferability.
And since we proved above that Known-Key Atomic Signatures satises Strong Unforgeability,
it follows that Known-Key Atomic Signatures also satises Weak Transferability.
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Figure 7: The structure of Known-Key Chain Signatures
B.2 Known-Key Chain Signatures
Known-Key Chain Signatures (KC) is a Weak -MVS scheme obtained by simplifying Chain
Signatures|it does not use unknown-key components in tags. So, each verier shares exactly
one key with the signer. Its algorithms operate as follows
 GenKC(1n) simply sets up pairwise shared keys. The signer is given a vector k of keys, and
each verier j is given k[j].
 SignKC(m;;k) performs exactly the same operations as in Chain Signatures, but only uses
the known-key components. We index subtag j in section r by a pair (r;j) with the natural
lexicographic ordering. This subtag is computed for the tag C(m) as follows.
C(m)[r;j] , MAC(m jj
(t;t0)<(r;1)
C;d(m)[t;t0];k[j]) (4)
 VerKC(m;;Kj) nds the highest section  for which j's subtag is supported, and returns .
If there is no such section, then it returns 0. Verication never returns ?, since the signer
cannot be compromised.
Figure 7 shows the structure of KC, where we write kp for k[p mod n]
Generating a signature requires n steps: the tag contains n subtags, and each step produces
one subtag by computing the MAC of a vector that is of size at most n. Thus the total cost
of generating a tag is O(n22). The total cost can be signicantly reduced, as explained in
Appendix D.
Theorem 14. For any  2 N>0, if the MAC satises CTA Unforgeability, then KC is a Weak
-MVS scheme.
Proof. -Completeness. This follows trivially from the denition of KC, just as for Chain Signa-
tures.
Unforgeability. The proof is the same as for Chain Signatures when the adversary causes some
verier to return a value in N>0: an adversary B is constructed that violates CTA Unforgeability
of the MAC.
Weak Transferability. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Non-Accusability of
Chain Signatures: if an adversary violates Weak Transferability, then by denition, some subtag
will be supported that takes as input a subtag that is not supported. The probability of success
for our constructed adversary in this case, however, is 
n rather than 
(d+1)n, since the constructed
29adversary that violates CTA Unforgeability of the MAC guesses a key kt from a set of size n rather
than size (d + 1)n.
C Impossibility of Avoiding Split Tags
Transferabilityasserts that, except with negligible probability, even compromised signers cannot nd
split tags. But for traditional digital signatures, it is impossible to have split tags, since all veriers
use the same function to check tags. A natural question is whether such perfect transferability can
be achieved in our MVS setting.
We can prove that an 1-MVS scheme must contain a digital signature scheme to avoid split
tags perfectly. Start with an 1-MVS scheme (Gen;Sign;Ver) that satises 1-Completeness, Un-
forgeability, and Non-Accusability. Now strengthen Transferability to the following.
Perfect Transferability. For any PPT A and for any choice of I0  I,
Pr[(k;fKigi2I)   Gen(1d;1n);
(m;)   AfVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0(1d;1n;k;fKigi2I0) :
(9j;j0 2 I   I0 : Ver(m;;Kj) 6= ? ^ Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ?
^
 Ver(m;;Kj)   Ver(m;;Kj0)
  > 1)] = 0
Note that the only dierence between the denition of Transferability (see page 4) and Perfect
Transferability is that (d;n) is set to 0 in the denition of Perfect Transferability.
Perfect Transferability implies that there are no split tags under any choice of keys, because if
a split tag existed, then an adversary that guessed message and tag pairs at random would have
some non-zero probability of choosing it. Also note that we can remove the restriction on veriers j
and j0 being non-compromised: if there is any pair of veriers for which a split tag can be created,
then an adversary can choose not to compromise those veriers and guess the message and split
tag with a non-zero probability. We can thus rewrite Perfect Transferability as follows:
8d;n;8k;fKigi2I 2 Range(Gen(1d;1n);8m;;8j;j0 2 I :
(Ver(m;;Kj) 6= ? ^ Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ?) =)

Ver(m;;Kj)   Ver(m;;Kj0)

  1
To simplify the statement of Perfect Transferability further, we must consider a restricted class of
1-MVS schemes.
Given any 1-MVS scheme  = (Gen;Sign;Ver), we can dene a new 1-MVS scheme 0 =
(Gen;Sign;Ver0), in which the verier only returns 0, 1, and ?. To do so, Ver0(m;;Kj) calls
Ver(m;;Kj) and gets a reply v. Then Ver0 returns v if v is one of 0, 1, or ?. Otherwise,
Ver0 returns 0. Note that Ver0 satises 1-Completeness if Ver does, since 1-Completeness for 
guarantees that Ver always returns 1 on message and tag pairs generated by Sign. And it is trivial
to see that 0 satises each of Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, Strong Unforgeability, Perfect
Transferability, and Transferability if  does. We call 0 a normalized 1-MVS scheme from .
Since veriers that do not return ? in a normalized 1-MVS scheme either return 0 or 1, and
j1   0j > 1 holds, Perfect Transferability can be rewritten for normalized 1-MVS schemes as
follows:
8d;n;8k;fKigi2I 2 Range(Gen(1d;1n);8m;;8j;j0 2 I :
(Ver(m;;Kj) 6= ? ^ Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ?) =) Ver(m;;Kj) = Ver(m;;Kj0)
30Perfect Transferability interacts with Unforgeability, since veriers in a normalized 1-MVS
scheme that satises Perfect Transferability can all simulate the actions of other veriers perfectly;
a tag that violates Unforgeability must do so for all veriers at once.
For digital signature schemes, the property corresponding to Unforgeability is Chosen Message
Attack (CMA) security [16]. A digital signature scheme is secure under CMA if no adversary A
can produce a message m and tag  that causes the verication algorithm to return 1, even if A
can see tags for messages of its choice. Naturally, as in Unforgeability, the adversary cannot return
a message it requested from its signing oracle.
The following theorem says that any normalized 1-MVS scheme that satises Perfect Transfer-
ability instead of Transferability is eectively a digital signature scheme secure under CMA [16].15
The intuition behind the theorem is that Perfect Transferability eectively makes all veriers use
the same algorithm: access to one verier allows perfect simulation of the actions of any other
verier.
Given a normalized 1-MVS scheme  = (Gen, Sign, Ver) that satises 1-Completeness, Un-
forgeability, Non-Accusability, and Perfect Transferability, we can dene a digital signature scheme
D
j = (GenD, SignD, VerD) as follows for any j in I. Let GenD(1d) call Gen(1d;1n) to produce
public key K = Kj and secret key k = k. Then SignD(;k) just calls Sign(;k). And VerD(;;K)
calls Ver(;;Kj), getting response v. VerD returns v if v is 0 or 1, and VerD returns 0 if v is ?,
since all veriers use the same verication function in D
j , hence never disagree about its return
value.
Theorem 15. If (Gen, Sign, Ver) is a normalized 1-MVS scheme satisfying 1-Completeness,
Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, and Perfect Transferability, then, for any j 2 I, D
j is a digital
signature secure under CMA.
Proof. By the contrapositive. Suppose that we are given a non-uniform PPT adversary A that
violates CMA security of D
j with non-negligible probability .
We will construct a PPT B that violates Unforgeability of the MVS scheme for any I0  I
such that j 2 I0 and 9j0 2 I   I0, as follows. B is given 1d;1n, fKigi2I0, and oracle access to
Sign(;k) = SignD(;k) and fVer(;;Ki)gi2I I0, so in particular, B knows Kj. B proceeds as
follows:
 B calls A(1d;Kj)
{ When A requests SignD(m;k), B calls the signing oracle Sign(m;k) and returns its
response.
{ When A calls VerD(m;;K), then A evaluates and returns Ver(m;;Kj).
 When A returns m and , B returns m and .
When A succeeds, m and  satisfy Ver(m;;Kj) = VerD(m;;K) = 1. In this case, Perfect
Transferabilityand Non-Accusabilitytogether imply that Ver(m;;Kj0) = 1 with all but negligible
probability: Non-Accusability implies that Ver(m;;Kj0) 6= ? with all but negligible probability,
and Perfect Transferability (in its rewritten form for normalized 1-MVS schemes) states that in
this case, Ver(m;;Kj0) = Ver(m;;Kj) = 1 always holds. This violates Unforgeability. B has
never requested m from its signing oracle, because A is required by assumption never to request m
of its signing oracle. B succeeds with the same non-negligible probability  as A.
15Note that there is a normalized 1-MVS scheme for every 1-MVS scheme.
31w0(m) := m;
v0(m) := NULL;
for p := 1 to 
wp(m) := h(wp 1(m) jj vp 1(m));
for p0 := 1 to n
C(m)[p;p0] := MAC(p jj wp(m);kp);
vp(m) := h(
n
jj
t=1
C(m)[p;t])
Figure 8: The hashing version of Known-Key Chain Signatures
Thus, (Gen;Sign;Ver(;;Kj)) is a digital signature secure under CMA if (Gen, Sign, Ver) is a
normalized 1-MVS scheme that satises 1-Completeness, Unforgeability, Non-Accusability, and
Perfect Transferability.
D Ecient Chain Signatures
To make Chain Signatures and Known-Key Chain Signatures more ecient, we employ a dierent
implementation that uses a family of collision-resistant hash functions to keep the size of the input
to the MAC constant. The algorithm for generating tags using Known-Key Chain Signatures is
presented in Figure 8. There, h is chosen from H, a family of collision-resistant hash functions,
operator jj is concatenation as before, and we dene x jj y = x if y = NULL. To generate a tag, a
signer follows the same algorithm as before, except that the input to the MAC in a given section is
now the section number, along with the hash of the concatenation of two values: (1) the input to
the previous section, and (2) the hash of the previous section.
To check a subtag in section p, a verier must use each subtag in each section that precedes
section p and build up wp(m), the input to the MACs in section p. Veriers follow the algorithm in
Figure 8 to build up wp(m) and use it compute the MACs corresponding to the subtags they are
checking.
To calculate the time needed to compute a tag, we assume that both the hash and the MAC
execute in time linear in the length of their input. We also assume that both the hash and the
MAC produce a constant-size output.
The loop over p in Figure 8 has  iterations, and each iteration involves a hash of a value of
constant length, followed by a loop with n iterations and a hash computation over data of size O(n).
Since p has size log and wp(m) has constant size, the loop over p0 takes time O(nlog). There is
also an initial cost of time O(jmj) to compute w1(m). So, the total time to generate Known-Key
Chain Signatures is O(jmj +  + nlog + n) = O(jmj + nlog).
This more ecient algorithm for Known-Key Chain Signatures is generalized to Chain Signa-
tures in Figure 9. Similar to Known-Key Chain Signatures, the input to the MAC for a given
component is a number indexing the component, along with the hash of the concatenation of two
values: (1) the input to the previous component, and (2) the hash of the previous component.
We can calculate the running time of the algorithm of Figure 9 as follows. The loop over p has
 iterations. And each iteration has a hash over data of constant size, followed by a loop with n
iterations (each performing a MAC of data of size O(log)), and a hash of data of size O(n). Then
there is a hash of data of constant size, a loop with dn iterations (each performing a MAC of data
of size O(log)), and a hash of data of length O(dn). And, as before, there is an initial cost of
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0(m) := m;
v0
0(m) := NULL
for p := 1 to 
wp(m) := h(w0
p 1(m) jj v0
p 1(m))
for p0 := 1 to n
C;d(m)[p;1;p0] := MAC(2(p   1)jjwp(m);k0[p0])
vp := h(
n
jj
t=1
C;d(m)[p;1;t])
w0
p(m) := h(wp(m)jjvp(m))
for p0 := 1 to dn
C;d(m)[p;2;p0] := MAC((2(p   1) + 1)jjw0
p(m);k1[p0])
v0
p(m) := h(
dn
jj
t=1
C;d(m)[p;2;t])
Figure 9: The hashing version of Chain Signatures
O(jmj) to compute w1(m). So, the time needed to compute Chain Signatures using the algorithm
of Figure 9 is O(jmj + (nlog + n + dnlog + dn)) = O(jmj + dnlog).
To use the algorithms of Figures 8 and 9 in Known-Key Chain Signatures and Chain Signatures,
we must modify the proofs of Unforgeability and Non-Accusability for Chain Signatures, and Weak
Transferability for Known-Key Chain Signatures, since arguments based on unique input sizes to
the MACs of each section no longer work. Instead, the unique prex p along with the length of
p jj wp(m) in the computation MAC(p jj wp(m);kp) in the algorithm guarantees that the signing
oracle would only have performed a given computation for a subtag in the pth section.
In these new versions of Chain Signatures and Known-Key Chain Signatures, we say that a
subtag is supported if it is identical to the MAC of the hash value using wp or w0
p dened recursively
in Figures 8 and 9 over all previous components and the message. So, a verier can determine if
its subtags are supported by computing the hashes of previous components and the message and
computing the MAC of this value.
Lemma 16. If MAC satises CTA Unforgeability and H is a family of collision-resistant hash
functions, then Chain Signatures using the algorithm described in Figure 9 satises -Completeness,
Unforgeability, and Non-Accusability.
Proof. -Completeness. As before, -Completeness follows by construction: signing and veri-
cation use the same algorithms to generate and check tags, so VerCS(m;SignCS(m;;k);Kj) = 
for any  and any choice of j.
Unforgeability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that adversary A violates Unforgeabil-
ity for some I0  I with probability . We construct an adversary B that attempts to violates CTA
Unforgeability of the MAC (for some key k0) and collision-resistance of the family H. B is given
MAC and VF oracles and is given oracle access to a hash function h chosen randomly from H.
B chooses a key k
t uniformly at random from the n known keys and generates a new instance
of Chain Signatures by calling GenCS and replacing calls to MAC(;k
t) with calls to B's MAC
oracle when signing and B's verication oracle when verifying. B uses h as its hash function in
the execution of signing and verication. When A succeeds, returning m and , the denition of
Unforgeability states that there is some j 2 I   I0 for which VerCS(m;;Kj) > 0). This means j
must have (at least) a supported subtag in component 1 of section 1.
33B returns 0jjh(m) as its message and [1;1;t] as its tag. With probability 1=n, it holds that t = j,
since t was chosen uniformly at random and independently of j. And MAC(0jjh(m);k0) = [1;1;t]
in this case, because [1;1;t] = [1;1;j] is the only subtag for j in component 1 of section 1, so
it must be supported. The prex 0 in the MAC computation guarantees that this MAC could only
have been computed for the rst component of the rst section. There are two possible cases.
In the rst case, A requested some m0 6= m from its signing oracle such that h(m) = h(m0).
Then 0jjh(m) = 0jjh(m0), so this message was requested of the MAC oracle, and CTA Unforgeability
is not violated. But m0 and m are a collision for the hash function, so B returns m and m0 and
violates collision resistance of H.
In the second case, A did not request any m0 such that h(m) = h(m0), so B never requested
0jjh(m) from its MAC oracle, since A never requested m, by assumption. So, B succeeds in violating
CTA Unforgeability.
So, either B violates CTA Unforgeability or returns a collision. And at least one case must
occur with non-negligible probability if A succeeds with non-negligible probability. So, B succeeds
with non-negligible probability and Chain Signatures satises Unforgeability.
Non-Accusability. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that some adversary A violates
Non-Accusability for some I0  I with probability . Similar to the proof of Unforgeability, we
construct a B that attempts to violates CTA Unforgeability of the MAC and collision resistance of
the family H by building a new instance of Chain Signatures and calling A. Instead of choosing a
key at random from the known keys, however, B chooses a key kt from the union of the known keys
and the unknown keys. When A succeeds and returns m and , the denition of Non-Accusability
states that there must be some j in I  I0 such that VerCS(m;;Kj) returns ?, which means that
there is some supported subtag for j in a component r that takes as input a non-supported subtag
for j. Without loss of generality, let the component for the non-supported subtag for j immediately
precede the component for the supported subtag for j. And let this be the lowest position in the
tag at which a supported subtag in one component follows a non-supported subtag in the previous
component.
There is a 1=((d + 1)n) probability that kt is the key used to compute this supported subtag,
since t was chosen uniformly at random and independently of choice of the non-supported subtag.
Suppose that the non-supported subtag for t is in component 2 of section r   1, followed by
a supported subtag for t in component 1 of section r (the same argument applies for a non-
supported subtag in component 1 of some section r followed by a supported subtag in component
2 of section r, but the indices dier accordingly). B returns as a message m0 the input for the
supported subtag in component 1 of section r: 2(r   1)jjh(w0
r 1(m)jjv00
r 1(m)), where w0
r 1(m) is
the normal computed value for component 2 of section r   1 in the signing algorithm of Figure 9,
and v00
r 1(m) = h(
dn
jj
p=1
[r   1;2;p]). This is the normal algorithm for computing the v0 value in
the pseudo-code, but v00 contains a non-supported subtag for j from . B returns as its tag 0 the
corresponding supported subtag for j in component 1 of section r.
By the denition of Non-Accusability, when A succeeds, the MAC of the message returned by
B is the value of the tag returned by B. So, the only question is whether or not this message was
requested from the MAC oracle already.
Since the message starts with 2(r   1), it could only be requested from the MAC oracle in an
execution of the signing algorithm for component 1 of section r. There are two possible cases.
In the rst case, A requested an m00 signed such that the execution of the signing algorithm
leads to a hash collision either with v00
r 1(m) or with h(w0
r 1(m)jjv00
r 1(m)). In either case, B can
nd this collision by computing these values for all messages submitted to the signing oracle. This
34violates collision resistance of h.
In the second case, no such m00 was requested, so the message returned by B would never have
been input to a MAC in B's simulation of the signing oracle. To see why, notice that v00
r 1(m) is
the output of a hash that takes as input a non-supported MAC. This cannot occur in the normal
computation of the signing oracle. So, if no message was requested that leads to the same value
of v00
r 1(m) or h(w0
r 1(m)jjv00
r 1(m)), then m0 was never requested of the signing oracle. And this
means that the message and tag returned by B violated CTA Unforgeability of the MAC.
Thus, either m0 and 0 violate CTA Unforgeabilityof the MAC with non-negligible probability or
a collision is found with non-negligible probability. So, B succeeds with non-negligible probability,
and Chain Signatures satises Non-Accusability.
As before, Weak Transferability of Known-Key Chain Signatures follows from a parallel argu-
ment to Non-Accusability of Chain Signatures, but with a success probability of =n instead of
=(d + 1)n.
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